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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates to what extent the international financial
community has taken into account the risk characteristics of borrowing less
developed countries when granting loans. Specifically, this study analyzes
the determinants of the spread between the interst rate charged to a
particular country and the London Interbank Borrowing Rate (LIBOR). The
empirical analysis uses data on 727 public and publicly guarantied
Eurodollar loans granted to 19LDC's between 1976 and 1980. The results
obtained show that lenders in Eurocredit markets have tended to take into
account (some of) the risk characteristics of borrowers. In particular it was
found that the level of the spread will be positively related to the debt/GNP
ratio and the debt service ratio. On the other hand, the spread will be
negatively related to the international reserves to GNP ratio and the
propensity to invest. The results obtained also show that an increase in the
foreign debt coupled with an equivalent increase in international reserves
will tend to leave the perceived probability of default unaffected. The
empirical analysis presented in this paper also indicates that as late as 1980
the international financial community had not perceived any significant
increase in the probabilities of defaulting in the countries that eventually
run into serious debt problems (i.e., Argentina, Brazil, Mexico).
Sebastian Edwards
Department of Economics
University of California, LA
405 Hilgard Avenue
Los Angeles, CA 900241
1. Introduction
The recent foreign debt crisisfaced by some less developedcountries
(LDC'S) —i.e.,,Mexico, Brazil, Argentina —hasgenerated concern among
economists, bankers and politicians. In
particular, the ability of the
international banks to distinguish
between "good' and "bad" risks hasbeen
questioned. It has even beensuggested that the inability to restrictcredit
to countries with low "credit
worthiness" has resulted in theoverextension of
some major banks and that, as aconsequence, this has increased the probabil-
ity of a global international financial
collapse.1
The purpose of this paper is toinvestigate to what extent the
international financial community has takeninto account the risk characteris-
tics of borrowing less developedcountries when granting loans.Specifically,
this study analyzes the determinantsof the spread between the interestrate
charged to a particular country and the LondonInterbank Borrowing Rate
(LIBOR). If the financial
community distinguishes between countries with
different probabilities of..default, theseperceptions will be reflected in the
spreads over LIBOR, with riskier countries(i.e., countries with a higher
probability of default) being charged ahigher risk premium or spread. When
the perceived probability of defaultexceeds a given level, however, that
particular country will be completelyexcluded from the credit market (Eaton
and Gerowitz 1980, l98la,b; Sachsand Cohen 1982, Folkers—Landau 1982.)
The empirical analysis of the determinantsof the default risk premium is
important for several reasons. First,
an understanding of the factors that
influence lending behavior, is useful forborrowing countries. With this
knowledge LDCs can take positive
steps towards managing their economies ina
way such that the perceived default risk is keptat a level compatible with
what lenders think is prudent.
Second, additional information on how the2
market assesses default risk will be helpful for determining the probability
that the present repayment difficulties faced by some LDC's can be transformed
into a major global crisis. Also, this analysis will provide insights on the
international banks lending behavior, that will be helpful to assess to what
extent they have been (partially) responsible for the present debt crisis.
And third, empirical information on the relationship between the level of the
foreign debt and its cost is useful for the analysis of optimal borrowing
strategies and of the social rate of discount in an open economy.2
A number of papers have recently analyzed the theoretical determinants of
default country risk.3 Early studies (i.e., Bardhan, 1967) mainly focused on
the relationship between the level of foreign debt and the cost of foreign
borrowing, trying to define "optimal" borrowing strategies. More recent work,
however, has expanded the analysis in several directions: First, the
existence of credit ceilings, above which countries cannot borrow, has been
explicItly introduced into the analysis (Eaton and Gersowitz, 1980, 1981a,b,
Sachs and Cohen, 1982 and Folkerts—Landau 1982.) Second, variables other than
the level of foreign debt have been explicitly considered as affecting the
default risk premium. In particular, it has been argued that in a general
equilibrium framework the level of international reserves will be related to
the level of debt, and thus could affect the level of default risk (Feder and
Just, 1979; Eaton and Cersowitz, 1980, 1981a). Also it has been pointed out
that the propensity to invest will be negatively related to the risk
premiums. The reason for this is that a higher propensity to invest will
generally indicate a higher potential for future growth, and thus, a lower
probability of default (Sachs and Cohen, 1982). Third it has been argued that
the current account will affect the default premium (Sachs, 1981; Sachs and
Cohen, 1982).3
Recent theoretical analyses have also made a distinctionbetween bond and
bank foreign financing, and have explicitly Introducedthe possibility of
rescheduling debt payments (Sachs and Cohen, 1982; Sachs, l982).Finally, it
has been argued that if borrowers and lenders have differentperceptions with
respect to the probability of default, the analysis of optimal borrowing
strategies would be substantially affected (I-Iarberger, 1976a,b, 1980).
The empirical work on the subject has investigated severalaspects of the
problem, including the probability of a country rescheduling itspayments
(Frank and Cline, 1971; Sargen, 1977), and the probability thata particular
LDC borrower has reached its credit ceiling (Eaton andCersowitz, 1980,
1981a,b). Generally, those studies that have analyzed lending behavior in
international financial markets have found that lenders tend to takeinto
account the riskiness of borrowers in making their lending decisions (Frank
and Cline, 1971; Feder and Just, 1977a,b; Feder and Ross, 1982;Sachs,
1981). In particular, it has been found that the interest rate spread,or
risk premium, will be higher for countries with a higherforeign debt ratio
(Frank and Cline, 1971; Feder and Just, 1977; Sachs, 1981). Moreover, ina
recent paper, Feder and Ross (1982) used data from the Institutional Investor
creditworthiness ranking to show that lenders risk perceptions aresystemat-
ically reflected in the spreads charged in Euromarkets. Also, this study
shows that the expected losses lenders expect to incur incase of default are
quite low ——typicallybetween 4 and 7 percent.
The analysis presented in this paper extends previous work on thesubject
In several directions. First, while most of the previous work usedcross—
section data for a particular year or quarter, the present studycovers
several years (1976—1980). Second, the sample considered in thispaper only
includes loans denominated in Eurodollars, thus avoiding the problem of4
different currency composition of loans, mentioned by McDonald (1982,
p. 630). Also this paper only includes public and publically guaranteed
loans, thus restricting the analysis to the determinants of country risk, as
distinct from financial risk.5 Finally, the present study has considered a
larger set of possible determinants of the probability of default than
previous work.
In Section 2 of this paper a simple framework for analyzing the
determinants of the (subjective) probability of default is presented. It is
argued here that these determinants will basically depend on the natureof the
present value of the expected cost of defaulting. From a modelling pointof
view, different assumptions regarding the specific form of this costwill
yield different sets of determinants of this probability. In this section a
specific example is presented, assuming that in a two periodsworld the cost
of default can be represented as a fraction of the second period output (Sachs
and Cohen, 1982). Section 3 presents results obtained from the empirical
analysis of the determinants of the spread between LIBOR and the interest rate
charged to different countries. The analysis uses data on727 public and
publically guaranteed Eurodollar loans granted to 19 developing countries
between 1976 and 1980. The results obtained show that lenders in Eurocredit
markets take into account some of the risk characteristics of borrowers. Even
though the results obtained are quite robust they are, in some cases,somewhat
surprising, leading us to conclude that even though internationalbanks have
taken into account some of the borrower's characteristics, they havetended to
overlook others. In that sense, the results presented in this paper provide
some basis to presume that the present crisis is partially aresult of banks'
lending practices. However, these results do suggest that byand large the
main causes of the present foreign debt crisis have been the unexpected5
external shocks of the late 1970s andearly l980s (i.e., the oil price shock
of 1979—1980, the world recession of 1980and the high interest rates that
prevailed during this period). This section alsopresents estimates of the
perceived probabilities of default implicit in theeconometric estimates,
Finally, in this section I present an analysis of theresiduals obtained from
the regression analysis. Section 4 containssome concluding remarks,
2. The Determinants of the Probability ofDefault
The principal distinction between asovereign and a private borrower is
that the former can repudiate its debt without(totally) losing control of the
assets financed by it (see Buiter, 1980; Eaton andGersowitz, 1980). General—
ly, however, the repudiation of the foreign debt willresult in some costs to
the borrower. These costs can take severalforms, including the country's
complete exclusion from future borrowing in the internationalcapital market,
The decision to repudiate the debt will depend bothon the level of the
debt and the cost of repudiating it.
Broadly speaking, a country will
repudiate its debt if its value exceeds thepresent value of the (expected)
cost of repudiating it. Assuming that thIs cost (C)is a continuous non-
negative random variable, and denoting the value of the debtas D, the
probability of default can be written as:
p =prob{C(D} (1)





where E(C) is the expected value of C. Then, considering (2) with an
equality sign, the probability of default can be written as:
(3)
This expression has the following desirable properties: P/3D > 0;
aP/E(C) < 0; and lim p =1.Also, recognizing the p has to be bounded
by 0 and 1 (i.e., 0p1), we find that, lim P =0.
E(C)+oo
Equation (3) is a very general expression that simply states that the
determinants of the probability of default will depend on the initial value of
the debt and on the nature of the cost of repudiating it. From a modelling
perspective, different sets of determinants of this probability can be derived
depending on the nature of the expected cost chosen. In that sense then, it
is not surprising that Sachs and Cohen (1982) find that the probability of
default will be a decreasiug function of the propensity to invest.6 The
reason for this is that they assume that the cost of default is a function of
future output which, on its turn, will depend on the present propensity to
invest.
In order to further illustrate this point, assume that the expected cost
of repudiating the debt can be expressed as a proportion a of the present
value of output. Furthermore, in order to simplify the exposition assume that
the case of a two period world where output in period 2 (q2) can be written
as:
q2=q1+a111+a2n+X2 (4)
where q1 is output in period 1;Ii is net investment in period 1; n is7
the rate of growth of the labor force;a1 and a2 are constant parameters;
and X2 is a random shock with meani and variance ci2.7 Then, thepresent
value of the expected cost ofrepudiating the debt is (where r is the
interest rate on the debt):8
aE(q2) 1 E(C) =l+r
=
•n- {aq1+ aa111 +aa2n + ap} (5)
and the probability of defaultp can be written as:
p ={i-all+ a1f1 + a2n/q1 + J} [(l+r)d1] (6)
where f1 is the average propensity to invest inperiod 1 (f1 =11/q1)
and d1 is the debt—output ratio
(a1= D1/q1).
According to this expression then, if the cost ofrepudiating the debt is
a fraction of future output, the probability of default willdepend positively
on the debt—output ratio d1, and negatively on thepropensity to invest
(f1) and the rate growth of population (a).
It can be further assumed that the cost ofrepudiating the debt will not
be a constant function of futureoutput, but that a will depend on some
economic variables. In particular, itmay be argued that a will depend
positively on the level of internation reserves holdings. Thereare several
ways to rationalize this assumption. On the one hand, an importantproportion
of international reserves are held in the form offinancial instruments
maintained in foreign banks which can easily be securedby the lender in case
of default. Secondly, itmay be assumed that the international financial
community will impose harsher penalties on countries who, inspite of holding
highly liquid reserves, decide to default on their debt.Then, if we include8
these considerations and denote the ratio of reserves to output by R, it is
possible to postulate that the probability of default can be written as:
pp( d, f, R, ...;13) (7)
(+) (—)(-)
wherethe signs in parentheses refer to the signs of the respective partial
derivatives, and where captures other possible determinants of p not
explicitly considered by the previous analysis. In Section 3 below data on
over 700 Eurodollar loans granted between 1976 and 1980 to LDC's are used to
investigate the extent to which some of these variables (i.e., d, f, and
R), among others, affect the spread between the LIBOR rate and the interest
rate actually charged on these loans.
3. Estimation
Assume that, as postulated by Feder and Just (l977a,b), Eaton and
Gersovitz (1980) and Sachs (1981) among others, the spread (s) over LIBOR
charged on Eurodollar loans reflects the probability of default (p) of a
particular country. Then, observed data on the spread can be used to formally
analyze the way in which variables like the debt—output ratio, the propensity
to invest, and others affect the level of this perceived probability.
However, before empirically analyzing the determinants of the spread two
important questions should be addressed: (1) What is the functionalform of
the probability of default (p); and (2) What is the exact form of the
relationship between these two variables (s and p). A related question,
that was partially answered in the previous section, has to do with the
determinants of p.9
Assuming that banks maximize the present valueof profits, Feder and Just




for A =(/rj—i)8; and where iiis the elasticity of demand forloans;
h is the expected loss incase of default; and0 captures the cost of
capital for the bank. Equation (8) is highlyconvenient for the empirical
analysis, since by assuming that p has a logistic formit is possible to
write the logarithm of the spread asa linear function of the determinants
of p (Theil, 1971):
k
log=+E X1 + log A (9)
i=l
where the X11s are the determinants of theprobability of default (i.e., the
debt—output ratio, the reserves—output ratio, thepropensity to invest), and
where the &s are the respective coefficients.
In this section the results obtained from theestimation of an equation
of the type of (9) using data on 727public and publically guaranteed loans
granted to 19 LDC's during 1976—1980 are reported.
3.1 The Data
The analysis reported in thispaper uses annual data for 19 LDC's, who
received 727 public and publically guaranteed loansduring 1976—1980. The
spread variable for each country in a particularyear was constructed as a
weighted average of spreads actually charged for the individualpublic and10
publically guaranteed loans granted to that particular country. The basic
data were obtained from various issues of the world Bank's Borrowing in
International and Capital Markets. Table 1 contains the data on loan
characteristics, including the yearly average spread or "risk premium', for
the countries used in this study.9 The data presented in this table is quite
interesting. In particular it may be noted that, within each year,the
variation of the spreads across countries is not too high. For example, in
1979 the difference between the highest and lowest premiums are only 1.1
percentage points [1.603 for Ivory Coast and .517for Greece.]
A number of variables were considered as possible determinants of the
level of the spread, including those suggested by the model presented in the
preceding section. Specifically, the following variables wereincluded as
possibly affecting s n the empirical analysis:
(1)The debt—output ratio. As the model developed in Section 2 indicates ——
andhas been argued by Frank and Cline (1971), among others —itis
expected that this variable will have a positive coefficientin the
regression analysis. (See, also, Hanson 1974.) The data onthis
variable refers to public and publically guaranteed debt and was
obtained from the World Bank World Debt Tables;
(2)The ratio of debt service to exports. This indicator measures possible
cash—flow problems faced by a particular country. This variable has
been previously included by Frank and Cline (1971) and Federand Just
(l977a) in related studies, and it is expected that its coefficientwill
be positive. Data on this ratio was obtained fromthe World Debt
Tables.
(3)Ratio of international reserves to GNP. This indicator measuresthe







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Section 2, it is expected that itscoefficient will be positive. Some
previous work on the subject have also includedsome kind of
international liquidity indicator. See, forexample, Frank and Cline
(1971). This variable was constructed from dataobtained from the
International Financial Statistics.
(4)Loan duration. This variable is measuredin years, and measures the
(weighted) average maturity of loans granted toa particular country.
As has been shown by Feder and Ross (1982)its a priori sign in the
regression analysis Is ambiguous. The weightedaverage was constructed
from data reported in Borrowing in InternationalCapital Markets and is
presented in Table 1.
(5)Loan volume. This variable shows theaverage value of each loan
obtained by a particular country in a givenyear, and was obtained from
Borrowing in International Capital Markets. Also,a priori, its sign is
ambiguous.
(6)Propensity to invest. This variable, previously consideredby Sachs
(1981) in his empirical study on the determinants ofthe spread, will
tend to capture the country's perspectives for futuregrowth. As is
showninSection 2, and in Sachs and Cohen (1982), it willbe negatively
related to the level of the spread. This indicatorwas obtained from
data reported in the World Tables and in WorldDevelopment Report
(various issues).
(7)Ratio of the current account to CMI'. It has beenargued by Sachs (1981)
that this variable will be negatively relatedto the spread. The data
on this variable was obtained from World Tables and various issuesof
the World Development Report.16
(8)Average propensity to import. This indicator was constructed as the
ratio of imports to GNP, and measures the degree of openness of a
country. To the extent that this ratio captures the degree
vulnerability of a country to foreign shocks, it is expected that it
will be positively related to the probability of default (Feder and
Just, 1977a). This variable was constructed from data obtained from the
International Financial Statistics.
(9)Growth of per capita GDP. It has been argued that a higher rate of
growth of output will result in a lower probability of default (see
Avramovic, et al., 1964; Feder and Just, 1977a). Data on this indicator
was obtained from World Tables and the World Development Report.
Other variables were also considered as possible determinants of the
probability of default, including GNP per capita (Feder and Just, l977a), the
rate of inflation (McDonald, 1982), the variability of exports (Frank and
Cline, 1970), and the ratio of government expenditure to GNP. However, due to
space considerations, and since their inclusion did not affect the results in
any significant way, the estimates obtained when they were included are not
reported here.
3.2 Results
Equation (9) was estimated using pooled cross—section time—series data
for 19 countries during five years (1976—1980). For a list of the countries
see Table 3. For estimation purposes it was assumed that log Ant was equal
to a constant k plus a random element TJ (log Ant =k—ut).It was
further assumed that this random term Ut was formed of a country—specific
random error with zero mean and variance c; a time—specific random
element w, with zero mean and variance and an independently17
distributed random termc, with zero mean and variance a21° (See Feder
and Just 1977b, for a similar
assumption.) Then the equation to be estimated
can be written as:
log 5nt = +a + v +w + (10)
where






E(ww) =0for t s
c )= E(cc )= E(€e )= 0 ntns ntnt ntms
Expression (10) is a typical random—effecterror components equation.
The results presented in thispaper were obtained using the technique
suggested by Fuller and Batesse (1974) forestimating this kind of equation.
In the estimation (+k) was combined into a constant8.
One possible problem with the estimation of(10) is that, to the extent
that banks determine the spread and loanduration at the same time, use of
Fuller—Batesse's technique would be subject toa simultaneity bias. However,
following Feder and Ross (1982), and Beim (1977) itwas assumed that the
duration of the loan is determined by banksprior to the determination of the
spread. This indeed appears to be the case in theEurocurrency credit itiarkets
(see Euromoney, September 1978).
Table 2 contains the results obtained from theestimation of equation (1)
using Fuller—Batesse's technique.'1 These resultsare quite satisfactory,18
TABLE2
Estimationof Equation (10) Using Pooled Cross—Sections
of Time Series: Fuller—Batesse Procedure
Equation Equation Equation Equation
Independent
Variabe (10.1) (10.2) (10.3) (10.4)
Constant 0.329 0.141 0.305 0.465
(1.422) (0.726) (1.216) (2.043)
Debt/GNP 0.622 0.544 0.634 0.728
(2.512) (2.251) (2.461) (2.905)
International Reserves/GNP —1.155 —1.211 —1.079 —1.152
(—2.164) (—2.253) (—1.632) (—2.107)
Debt Service/Exports 0.426 0.567 0.440
(1.688) (2.344) (1.797)
Loan Duration —0.012 —0.011 —0.013 —0.007
(—0.648) (—0.581) (—1.719) (—0.400)
Loan Value —0.001 —0.001 —0.001
(—1.340) (—1.658) (—1.269)









0.022 0.020 0.024 0.027
0.054 0.058 0.050 0.056
0.019 0.021 0.019 0.020
MSE 0.021 0.023 0.021 0.021
Notes The numbers in parentheses are asymptotic t—statistics. MSE refers to
the mean square error of the transformed regression.19
both from the point of view ofthe mean square errors ofthe regressions, and
from the perspective of thesigns and level of significance ofthe
coefficients.12 Broadlyspeaking, the empirical evidence showsthat
international lending behavior to LDC'stends to take into accountsome of the
economic characteristics of thespecific borrowing countries. Asmay be seen,
in all regressions thedebt—output ratio is significantlypositive, and
smaller than one. This result
suggests that a higher level of indebtedness
will be associated with a higherprobability of default and thus, a higher
spread over LIBOR, With respect to the
debt—service ratio, its coefficients
are also positive, as expected, andsignificant either at the 5 or 10percent
level.
One of the most interesting
findings of this analysis is that the
coefficient of the reserves to GNPratio is consistently negative,as
expected, and with the exception of equation(10.3) it is always significant
at the 5% level. Also, the estimatedvalues of these coefficientsare high,
indicating that the behavior of the reservesratio has played an important
role in the determination of the
perceived probability of default. Themain
importance of thIs result is that, froma policy point of view, countries that
want to reduce the probbility obeing excluded from the International
financial market due to an increase inthe perceived probability ofdefault,
should be particularly careful inmanaging their international reserves.
Also, these results suggest that theanalysis of the demand for international
reserves should incorporate the level offoreign indebtedness as an additional
determinant of the desired level ofinternational liquidity. It is also
interesting to note that coefficient of thereserves ratio is quite high in
absolute terms, exceeding in allcases the estimated value of the coefficient
of the debt to GNP ratio.20
The coefficients of loan duration and loan value are negative,but
insigificant, as are the coefficients ofthe imports—output ratio and
growth. In all regressions the estimatedcoefficient of the gross
investment/GNP ratio was negative, as expected. Also inall cases, except in
equation (10.3), it was significant, indicatingthat, as the model in Section
2 suggests, a higher propensity to investreflects higher expected output in
the future, and as a consequence a lower perceivedprobability of default.
The coefficients of the current account ratiois positive in the two
regressions where it was included (10.1)and (10.3), being significant in only
one of the cases. This is asomewhat puzzling result, since it indicatesthat
a lower deficit (or higher surplus)will result in a higher and perceived
probability of default and spread.The problem with this is that, with other
things given ——especiallythe investment ratio —ahigher current account
deficit means that the same investment is beingfinanced with a higher
proportion of foreign savings, and onewould generally expect that in this
case (i.e., lower domestic savingsratio) the perceived probability of default
would be higher.
It is interesting to note that in all casesthe estImated variance of the
time—specific element exceeds the estimated countryspecific variance
indicating that during the periodunder consideration differences across
time in the country risk premium were moreimportant than differences across
country. This result is capturingthe fact that throughout the period under
consideration (1976—1980) the level ofworld liquidity varied significantly.
On the whole, however, the low valueof the mean square error of the
regressions (MSE) show a quitesatisfactory fit.
From the results presented In Table2 it would be interesting to
investigate how the perceived probability
of default will be affected if a21
country increases its foreign debt to finance theaccumulation of
international reserves.'3 In order to answer thisquestion it is important to
realize that in this case, three right hand sidevariables from our default
risk equation (10) wIll be affected: (1)the debt/GNP ratio will increase,
tending to raise the spread; (2) the internationalreserves/GNp ratio will
rise, exercising a downward pressure on the spread, sinceits estimated
coefficient is negative; and (3) the debtservice/exports ratio will also go
up, generating additional positive pressure on the spread. Thefinal effect
of this policy, aimed at financing theaccumulation of reserves with new
foreign debt, on the spread will depend on the sum of thesethree effects, and
can be written in the following form:
a3 (y+j) d log s =[a1+ a2 + ]d DR (11)
where a1,a2 and a3 are the estimated regression coefficients of the
debt/GNP, reserves/GNP and debt service/exports ratiosrespectively; y is
the fraction of the debt's principal that hasto be amortized every year
(i.e., one over the duration of the debt); I is the interestrate actually
charged (LIBOR plus the spread); XR is the exports/GNPratio; and DR is
the debt/GNP ratio. In order to illustrate the totalimpact of this policy,
on the spread, consider the case where y =0.125(i.e., the duration of the
loan in 8 years), i =0.12and XR =0.225.The expression in square
brackets in (10) will have a value of —0.069 for the a'sobtained from
equation (10.1) in Table 2; a value of —0.050 for the a's obtainedfrom
equation (10.2); and for the a's obtained in equation (10.3) thisexpression
in square brackets has a value of 0.034.22
For all practical purposes, then, the results presented in Table 2
indicate that an increase in the foreign indebtedness ratio by 10%, coupled
with an increase of the international reserves ratio by 10% will tend to leave
the spread (and the perceived probability of default) unaffected. This could
be considered to be somewhat surprising, since international reserves are a
short—term highly volatile asset, which can be equickly depleted, while
foreign debt is a long term liability. (This case corresponds closely to the
recent experiences of Argentina and Chile.)
Summarizing, the evidence presented in this section shows that during the
recent past, lending behavior by international banks in Eurocurrency markets
has taken into account (some of) the economic characteristics of borrowers.
Even though some of the coefficients were sensitive to the specification of
the estimated equations, the general results tend to be consistent with what
was expected.
3.3 The Perceived Probabilities of Default
The econometric estimates reported in Table 2 can be used to compute the





l+exp{ +aX } on in nti
where = — kis the imputed value for a0 in equation (9) (for t
the estimated value of the constant in the regressionanalysis).'5 Table 3
presents estimated probabilities of defaultfor each year obtained from
equation (10.1) under the assumption that k equals2.50. Table 4, on the
other hand, contains the estimated perceived probabilities ofdefault under
the assumption that k =1.75.16A number of interesting characteristics of23
TABLE 3
Estjjated Perceived Probabilities ofDefault
From Equation (10.1) Assuming k 25
(Percent)
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Greece 8.0 8.0 7.7 7.2 7.9
Portugal 8.4 8.3 8.5 8.9 8.6
Spain 7.8 8.1 8.1 7.8 7.9
Yugoslavia 7.6 7.6 7.8 7.0 7.4
Argentina 8.4 8.7 8.8 7.2 6.1
Brazil 8.9 8.8 8.9 9.1 9.6
Colombia 8.7 8.3 78 7.5 7.3
Ecuador 7.8 8.0 8.4 8.6 8.6
Mexico 9.9 10.1 10.5 10.5 9.2
Panama 10.4 11.6 11.9 11.3 11.5
Uruguay io.& - 10.2 10.5 8.6 8.5
Venezuela 5.9 5.8 6.3 7.1 7.9
Indonesia 9.6 9.6 9.3 8.4 8.7
Korea 8.9 8.5 7.7 7.7 8.5
Malaysia 7.0 7.4 7.0 7.1 6.3
Phillipines 7.4 7.9 7.7 7.7 7.7
Thailand 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.6 7.8
Ivory Coast 9.9 10.0 9.4 9.9 10.0
Morocco 8.0 8.1 9.4 9.2 10.324
Table 4
Estimated perceived Probabilities of Default From
Equation (10.1) Assuming k =1.75
(percent)
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Greece 15.5 15.5 15.0 14.2 15.3
Portugal 16.3 16.1 16.4 17.1 16.6
Spain 15.2 15.6 15.7 15.2 15.3
Yugoslavia 14.8 14.8 15.2 13.7 14.4
Argentina 16.3 16.8 16.8 14.1 12.0
Brazil 17.1 16.9 17.2 17.4 18.2
Colombia 16.8 16.1 15.1 14.6 14.3
Ecuador 15.3 15.6 16.5 16.6 16.6
Mexico 19.0 19.2 19.8 19.8 17.6
Panama 19.7 21.8 22.3 21.2 21.6
Uruguay 20.1 19.3 19.9 16.6 16.5
Venezuela 11.7 11.4 12.4 14.0 15.4
Indonesia 18.5 18.3 17.8 16.3 16.8
Korea 17.1 16.4 15.0 15.0 16.4
Malaysia 13.4 14.5 13.8 13.9 12.4
Phillipines 14.4 15.4 15.0 15.1 15.1
Thailand 17.9 17.8 17.8 18.3 18.6
Ivory Coast 22.9 23.2 22.0 22.9 23.2
Morocco 19.1 19.4 22.1 21.6 23.725
these probabilities can be observed. First, itcan be seen that, within each
year, there is a fairly wide variation in the perceived probabilityacross
countries. For example, the results in Table 3 show that in1976, p ranges
from a lower value of 5.9% (Venezuela) to 10.6%(Uruguay). Second, for each
country, these probabilities of default show some variation through time.For
example, for the case of Ecuador the probability increasessteadily between
1976 and 1979. On the other hand, for thecase of Brazil, one of the
countries that eventually ran into serious foreign debtproblems, there is an
increase in the perceived probability of default ofapproximately one full
percentage point. Surprisingly, however, Argentina's probability declined
throughout the period.
The computations presented in Tables 3 and 4 suggest thateven as late as
1980 the international financial market had not predicted inany important way
the future payment difficulties faced by Argentina, Mexico, Uruguay and
Venezuela. At the present time a number of these countriesare facing foreign
debt crisis that have forced them to renegotiate a rescheduling of their
payments. Table 5 presents a picture of the rescheduling negotiations
underway as of March of 1983.
One possible explanation for the fact that the implicit probabilities in
Tables 3 and 4 don't seem to capture the 1981-1982 payments difficulties faced
by some countries, is that these problems were basically triggered by
unexpected events. In fact, according to some experts, including the
International Monetary Fund, these payments difficulties are (basically) the
result of external events that took place in the late 1970s,including the
increase in the price of oil in 1979—1980, the world recession thatbegan in
1980 and the huge increase in world interest rates. Eventhough these
external factors indeed have had a role in the present crisis, it isimportant26
TABLE 5
Countries Presently Negotiating Foreign Debt Rescheduling
(Millions US$)
Amount of Terms SpreadAmount
Debt Being (in years) ofGrace Over In
Country RenegotiatedRenegotiationPeriod LIBOR Arrears
Argentina 8,000/10,000 7 3 2.125 —
Brazil 4,700 8 1/2 2 1/2 2.25/2.5
Chile 2,600 8 5 —
CostaRicab 228 112
Cuba 1,000 10 3
EcuadorC 970 6 1 2.25
Madagascar 195 — — — 70
Mexico 14,900 8 4 1.875 100
Roniania 515 6 4 1.750 —
Yugoslavia 1,400 3 to 5 —
aAlso,Poland and Togo are, at the present time renegotiating their debts.
However there is no detailed data on these cases.
bAgreement reached in December 1982 (in Principle)
CAgreement reached in January 1983.
Source: IMF27
not to minimize the role of domestic
policies. In particular, the factthat
in most cases a largeproportion of the new indebtednesswas used to finance
consumption should be pointed out (seeKindleberger, 1977). For example, this
was the case of Chile 1979—1981 where
the foreign debt almostdoubled, with
domestic savings falling (see Edwards1983).
3.4 Residuals Analysis and OtherPossible Determinants of Country Risk
The analysis presented in thepreceding sections has focused exclusively
on the economic determinants of thepremium over Libor charged by the
financial community tosovereign borrowers. However, it is highlylikely that
this premium is also affectedby the lenders perception of politicalStability
in a particular country (see, forexample, Buiter, 1980). In order to
investigate this possibility the residuals fromthe regressions were analyzed,
and an average (for 1976—1980) residualfor each country was computed.
GS RES =Z[log s — hXth]/5 (13)
t =1
where 5nt is the spreadactually charged in period t tocountry n, and
where zLS
Xth is the estimated log of the spread using Fuller—Batesse's
GLS procedure. Then, a positivevalue of RES will indicatethat, on
average, the spread being charged to that particularcountry exceeds the
model's prediction. If the residualsare capturing the effect of omitted
variables related to politicalstability, countries with positive RES should
be considered as being politicallymore risky than the average.
Table 6 contains the estimatedaverage residuals obtained from equation
(10.1). These results are quite interesting.'7
In general, however, they
don't seem to provide an obvious
































information on their relative stability. This suggests that other effectsare
also being captured by residuals.18
4. Concluding Remarks
This paper has analyzed the relationship between foreign debt and default
country risk. The analysis presented suggests that, the probability of
default will depend on the relationship between the cost of defaulting and the
value of the debt. Once a particular function for the cost of default has
been chosen, the determinants of the country risk can be easily found.
The empirical analysis has used data on 727 public and publically
guaranteed loans granted to 19 LDCs during 1976 and 1980. The result obtained
suggest that banks lending behavior has tended to consider (some of) the
economic characteristics of countries when determining the spread they
charge. However, the results also suggest that, at least during this period,
banks might have overlooked some aspects of the developing countries'
economies. In particular, the finding of a large negative value for the
coefficient of the international reserves ratio suggests that banks might have
given excessive weight to this value ifl their lending decisions.30
Footnotes
'See, for example, Time (January 10, 1983), The Economist, (5—11 March
1983),Martin Feldstein (1983), Folkerts—Landau (1982). The indebtedness
situation is particularly critical regarding Latin American debtors. For
example, U.S. private banks have "extended credit of more than U.S. $50
billion to Mexico, Brazil and Argentina, an amount that exceeds 80 percent of
the banks equity" (Feldstein, 1983, p. 2). The extent of the indebtedness
crisis is reflected by the fact that in 1982 twenty countries undertook debt
renegotiations, while in the second half of the l970s an average of only 4
countries per year renegotiated their debts.
2See, for example, Harberger (1976, 1980).
3See McDonald (1982) for an excellent and exhaustive survey on the
subject. See also the analysis in Buiter (1980).
4From a historical perspective, it is interesting to notice that in the
recent time the number of defaults have been dramatically reduced, with the
number of debt rescheduling increasing substantially. For a historical
analysis of LDCs debt rescheduling and defaults, see Sachs (1982).
51n a previous paper (Edwards, 1981) I used data that included both
publicly guaranteed and private loans. Using data for the second quarter of
1980 it was found that the government guarantee resulted, on average, in a
reduction of the spread of one quarter of a percentage point.
6This is only true in their case "without" renegotiation.
71t is useful to think of equation (4) as being derived from a Cobb—
Douglas aggregate production function.
81n (5) the interest rate on the debt (r) was used to compute the
present value of the expected cost of repudiation. More generally, however,31
the domestic rate of time preference (p) should be used. In (5), then, it
is implicitly assumed that r =p.It should be noted, however, that the main
results are not altered if r p.
9Actually, Table 1 contains data for 23 countries. However, the results
reported in this paper refer to those 19 countries that have data for all five
years (1976—1980). It is important to note that these averages were
constructed using data on publicized loans only. To the extent that, on
average, the characteristics of non—publicized loans do not differ from that
of publicized, the results will not be affected.
'°In pooled time—series cross—section analysis it is usually assumed that
the error term has this form. For detailed discussions see Anderson and Hsiao
(1981) and Nerlove (1971). In the present case it is possible to think that
the country—specific term v will capture some characteristics specific to
each country, while the time—specific element (wt) will capture, among other
things, different liquidity situations in the market in everyyear.Equation
(9) was also estimated assuming fixed—effect country—specific and time—
specific terms. The results obtained, however, did not alter in a significant
way those reported in Table 2.
11Also, in the analysis presented in this paper, as in previous work
(i.e., Feder and Just l977a,b; Sachs 1981; and Feder and Ross 1982), the
possible role of fees and commissions has not been incorporated.
2These results were obtained using contemporaneous values of the spread
determinants (as in Feder and Just, 1977b). Sachs (1981), however, used
lagged values of the spread determinants. When lagged values of these
variables are used in the estimation of (10) some of the results reported in
Table 2 (i.e., the levels of significance) are affected.32
'3A recent case where this type of policy was deliberately persued is
Chile 1979—1981. During this period the increase in the level of foreign debt
was used almost in a one—to—one basis to accumulate international reserves.
See, for example, Harberger (1982) and Edwards (1983).
14These are reasonable values for these parameters. As may be seen from
Table 1, most of the loans considered in this study had a duration of around 8
years. On the other hand the LIBOR rate had the following values during this
period: 1976 =7.12%;1977 =7.42%;1978 =10.35%;1979 =13.15%;1980 =
17.98%.Finally, the average value of the exports/GNP ratio for these
countries was 0.233 in 1976 and 0.248 in 1980.
15me reason for the presence of in (12) Is that in order to
estimate the perceived probability of default we need estimated values for all
the a's from equation (9), including a0. Since our estimations only give
us the value of =+k we need to find plausible values for k, and of
in order to find these probabilities.
16Since k =logA — and A =[/(-1)]hO1,a reasonable range
for k can be obtained under alternative assumptions regarding n,i and
0. For example, if =1.2,h =0.10and 00.08, log A =2.01.
17For example, according to these results, Mexico, Malaysia, Spain and
Greece appear to be the "more stable" countries, with Yugoslavia, Ivory Coast,
Argentina and Brazil the less stable ones.
'8One possibility is that these residuals are capturing the fact that
some of these countries are oil—producers. However, when a dummyfor oil—
producing countries was included its coefficient was insignificant,and the
main results were not affected.33
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